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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Do plaintiffs have vested contract rights to 
their pension benefits such that a subsequent legislative 
enactment may not impair those rights? 
ACTION OF THE COURT BELOW 
This case was presented on stipulated facts to the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. After reviewing the 
stipulated facts, hearing additional evidence and argument of 
counsel, Judge Banks entered a decree permanently enjoining 
defendants from applying or attempting to apply a 1985 amend-
ment to the Utah Public Safety Retirement Act to plaintiffs in 
order to eliminate, postpone or reduce payment of plaintiffs1 
retirement benefits (R102-1Q3). Defendants thereafter filed 
their Notice of Appeal from Judge Banks1 decree (R184). 
Respondents raised several additional issues below which 
the lower court found unnecessary to decide because of its 
ruling on the breach of contract question. Respondents argued 
below that application of a subsequent amendment to divest them 
of their pension benefits also violated a statutory prohibition 
against retroactive legislation, as well as due process and 
equal protection provisions of the Utah State Constitution. 
Since the lower court's ruling should be affirmed, it is 
unnecessary for this Court to reach those additional issues. 
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STATUTES SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1, as enacted L. 1969, ch. 127, § 1: 
49-11-1. Short title of act—Scope. This act shall be 
known and may be cited as the Utah Public Safety Retirement 
Act. It shall include in its coverage all public employees 
engaged full time in public safety work, as herein set 
forth. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1, as amended L. 1983, ch. 215, § 1: 
49-11-1. Short title of act—Scope. This act shall be 
known and may be cited as the Utah Public Safety Retirement 
Act. It shall include in its coverage all public employees 
engaged full time in public safety work, as herein set 
forth, except a public employee serving as the commissioner 
of public safety, or as the elected or appointed sheriff or 
chief of police of a public safety organization, if that 
public employee files a formal written request seeking 
exclusion from coverage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1, as amended L. 1985, ch. 255, § 2: 
49-11-1. Short title—Scope. This act is known as the 
Utah Public Safety Retirement Act. It shall include in its 
coverage all public employees engaged full time in public 
safety work under this chapter, except a public employee 
serving as the commissioner of public safety, or as the 
elected or appointed sheriff or chief of police of a public 
safety organization, if that public employee files a formal 
written request seeking exclusion from coverage, but the 
public employee cannot continue employment in the same 
covered employer unit and receive payment from the retire-
ment office at the same time. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8(19), as amended L. 1983, ch, 224, 
§ 10 and L. 1985, ch. 174, § 1: 
(19) "Service" or "covered service" means "public safety 
service" rendered to an employer for compensation which is 
included in computations relating to membership status or 
benefit rights under this act. In no case may a retirement 
allowance or other benefit be granted under this act which 
is based upon the same service as has been or will be the 
basis for retirement benefits under some other Utah public 
retirement system. 
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Utah Code Ann, S 49-11-8(30) , as amended L. 1985, ch. 174, 
§ 1: 
(30) "Retirement" means withdrawal from active service 
with a retirement allowance granted under this act, 
Utah Code Ann, § 49-11-34, as amended L. 1983, ch. 218, § 2: 
49-11-34, Service retirement—Application for allowance— 
Requirements for early retirement. Any member who quali-
fies for service retirement may retire by making written 
application therefor to the retirement office and stating 
the proposed effective date of retirement which shall not 
be more than ninety days subsequent to the date of applica-
tion nor less than thirty days after notification of 
intention to retire has been given to the employer. 
The member is qualified to retire upon termination of 
services on or before the effective date of retirement if 
one of the following requirements is met: 
(a) The member has been credited with at least 20 years of 
service. 
(b) The member has been credited with at least ten years 
of service and has attained an age of 60 year or more. 
(c) The member has been credited with at least four years 
of service and has attained an age of 65 years or more. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-37, as amended L. 1975, ch. 147, § 5: 
49-11-37. Re-employment in public service after retire-
ment—Effect on allowance. If a retired member is 
re-employed full time in a position covered by this system 
he shall immediately notify the administrator who shall 
either suspend the said retirant's allowance or cancel the 
retired member's retirement subject to the following: 
If the member has been on retirement one year and the new 
employment may extend for one or more years the administra-
tor shall cancel the retirement and reinstate the retired 
member to active status with the same service credit which 
he had standing on his record at the time he last retired. 
He shall then begin participating again as a member of the 
system and accrue additional service credits. 
If the member has been on retirement less than a year or 
the new employment probably will last less than a year in 
the opinion of the retirant, then the pension part of the 
retirant's allowance shall be suspended for the duration of 
such employment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
1. The Plaintiffs/Respondents, Plaintiffs are 
sheriffs and chiefs of police ("police chiefs") of public 
safety organizations in the State of Utah and are members of 
the Utah Public Safety Retirement System. They and their 
employers regularly and continuously contributed to the Utah 
Public Safety Retirement Fund and its predecessor funds for 
periods ranging from 11 years to 35 years up to the time of 
their withdrawal from the system (R105 at 1! 2). In 1983, 
plaintiffs were given the option by statute to withdraw from 
coverage under the state's Public Safety Retirement System and 
to continue their employment with their respective public 
safety organizations. Plaintiffs opted to so exclude them-
selves from coverage and continue their employment. 
2. The Defendants/Appellants. Defendants are 
responsible for administration of the Public Safety Retirement 
System. Defendants contend that pursuant to a 1985 amendment, 
sheriffs and police chiefs are no longer able to exclude them-
selves from coverage under the system and remain employed with 
their same public safety organization. Defendants attempted to 
apply this amendment to plaintiffs by demanding that plaintiffs 
elect between retirement from their present positions or for-
feiture of their vested pension benefits. 
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3. The 1969 Retirement Act, The Utah Public Safety 
Retirement Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann, 5 49-11-1, et seq. , 
was enacted in 1969 for the purpose of providing, inter alia, a 
means whereby public safety employees, their employers and the 
State of Utah could provide employees and their dependents 
economic protection upon retirement, disability or death (R105 
at 11 2). The Act establishes a comprehensive scheme of retire-
ment benefits to be administered by the executive officer of 
the Utah State Retirement Board ("Retirement Board"), through 
the Utah State Retirement Office ("Retirement Office"), 
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Retirement Board. 
4. The 1983 Amendment. The Retirement Act was 
amended in 1983 ("1983 Amendment") to permit sheriffs and 
chiefs of police to request exemption from coverage under the 
Act (R105 an 11 3). The Retirement Office subsequently advised 
plaintiffs they could, pursuant to the 1983 Amendment, exempt 
themselves from coverage under the Retirement Act, receive 
retirement benefits if qualified, and continue in their present 
employment (R105 at 11 4). The Retirement Office set forth the 
official interpretation and policy of the Retirement Board with 
respect to the effect of the 1983 Amendment in a letter dated 
May 23, 1983 (R106 at % 5) . This policy was communicated, 
either orally or in writing, to each plaintiff (R106 at 11 5). 
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Each plaintiff thereafter requested exemption from the 
Act by completing a form provided by the Retirement Office. 
Each plaintiff's request for exemption was approved by the 
2 
Retirement Board (R106 at f1[ 6-7). As of the respective 
dates of their exemptions from the Act, each plaintiff was 
qualified for service retirement, having met all statutory 
requirements (R106 at % 9). 
Plaintiffs subsequently made application for service 
retirement by completing forms provided to them by the Utah 
State Retirement Office (R106 at 11 10). Upon approval of their 
respective applications for service retirement, plaintiffs 
became "retirants" under the Act (i.e., a retired member of the 
Utah Public Safety Retirement System who was receiving retire-
ment benefits) (R107 at 1[ 12). Upon approval of each plain-
tiff's application for service retirement, the Retirement 
Office calculated the dollar amount of each plaintiff's retire-
ment allowance, said amount being calculated in accordance with 
the formula set forth in the Retirement *ct (R107 at n 13). 
The dollar amount of plaintiff's respective retirement 
allowances was fixed as of the effective date of their retire-
ment and does not change except for a statutorily allowed 
zAlthough two of the plaintiffs were denied approval of 
service retirement by the Retirement Board because the 1983 
Amendment was passed prior to their requests for exemption, 
defendants have agreed to treat all plaintiffs uniformly for 
purposes of this case (Rpt. Transcript at pp. 3-4.). 
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cost-of-living adjustment (R107 at % 14). Payment of each 
plaintiff's retirement allowance has been made by the Utah 
State Retirement Office regularly and without interruption each 
month since the respective date of each plaintiff's retirement 
(R107 at U 15). As of the commencement of retirement payments 
by the Retirement Office, each plaintiff had satisfied all 
legal conditions necessary to retire and receive benefits (R107 
at 1 16) . 
Plaintiffs have made no employee contribution to the 
Utah Public Safety Retirement Fund since the date of their 
respective service retirements. Moreover, plaintiffs' respec-
tive employers have made no contribution on behalf of plain-
tiffs to the fund since the date of their respective service 
retirements. Plaintiffs have received no service credits for 
continued employment after the date of their respective service 
retirements (R108 at 1111 17-19). 
5. The 1985 Amendment. The Utah State Legislature 
amended the Retirement Act in 1985 ("1985 Amendment") to 
provide that a sheriff or police chief who requests exemption 
from coverage under the Act may not continue employment in the 
same covered employer unit and receive retirement benefits at 
the same time (R108 at H 20). Plaintiffs were then advised by 
the Retirement Office that they must either terminate their 
present employment or payment of their monthly retirement 
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allowance would be stopped. Plaintiffs were also advised by 
the Retirement Office that they may withdraw their request for 
exemption (R108 at %% 21-22).3 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
Pension statutes create a contractual relationship 
between the state and the pensioner. Thus, when the pensioner 
has satisfied all conditions precedent, the state is bound to 
perform the contract on the terms and conditions existing at 
the time the contract is formed. Retirement benefits vest by 
satisfying the all conditions precedent and may not be altered 
by subsequent legislation. 
Plaintiffs here had a vested contract right to receipt 
of their retirement benefits on the terms and conditions 
existing at the time they withdrew from the State's Retirement 
System. The State offered to pay retirement benefits to plain-
tiffs who satisfied certain conditions regarding retirement and 
exempted themselves from the Retirement System. Plaintiffs 
accepted this offer by satisfying those conditions and with-
drawing from the Retirement System pursuant to the 1983 Amend-
ment. Plaintiffs thereafter received retirement benefits and 
^The parties stipulated to certain facts and the Court 
entered findings of fact with respect to each specific plain-
tiff. These plaintiff specific facts are set forth in detail 
in the Court's Findings of Fact and need not be reiterated here 
(see R109-134). 
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continued their present employment, but did not continue to 
accumulate service credits or contributions made on their 
behalf by their respective employers. Thus, plaintiffs' 
benefits, including the right to continue their present 
employment, vested as of the respective dates they withdrew 
from the Retirement System and could not thereafter be impaired 
by subsequent legislative enactments. 
The legislative history of the 1983 Amendment is 
irrelevant here since it is well established that even curative 
statutes may not impair vested rights. Moreover, the legis-
lative history itself is inconclusive and there is no evidence 
chat the 1985 Amendment was intended to cure a misinterpreta-
tion of the 1983 Amendment. Neither of those amendments 
repeals by implication any other provision of Title 49, Chapter 
11. 
Finally, although vested rights may be altered under 
very limited circumstances, such circumstances are not present 
here. Defendants have not shown that plaintiffs, by exercising 
their rights here, have jeopardized the actuarial soundness of 
the state's Retirement System. More importantly, defendants 
have not provided plaintiffs with the required "substantial 
substitute" for their vested pension benefits, but rather have 
given plaintiffs a Hobson's choice between retirement benefits 
or continued employment, not a substitute for retirement bene-
fits and continued employment—to which plaintiffs are entitled 




THIS CASE PRESENTS NO NOVEL ISSUES OF LAW. 
A CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF 
CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC 
PENSIONERS HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN DEVELOPED BY 
THIS COURT. PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO RECEIVE 
PENSION BENEFITS WHILE REMAINING EMPLOYED 
VESTED AT THE TIME THE RETIREMENT BOARD 
APPROVED PLAINTIFFS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 
Defendants concede that vested retirement benefits may 
not be altered by subsequent legislation. (Appellant's Brief 
at p. 7). Defendants contend, however, that plaintiffs' right 
to receive pension benefits while remaining employed did not 
ripen into a vested contract right which could not be altered 
or amended by subsequent legislative action. jld. This argu-
ment misconstrues the nature of plaintiffs' constitutional and 
contractual rights. 
A contractual relationship arose between plaintiffs 
and the State of Utah at the time plaintiffs withdrew from the 
Retirement System. In 1983, the State offered to pay retire-
ment benefits for life to those sheriffs and police chiefs who 
(a) satisfied certain terms and conditions existing at the time 
(such as minimum service time), (b) exempted themselves from 
the Retirement System, and (c) made application to receive 
benefits. Plaintiffs accepted this offer by (a) completing the 
necessary "years of service" and other conditions, (b) exempt-
ing themselves from the Retirement System (thus forfeiting 
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their right to earn further service credit and pension bene-
fits), and (c) making application to receive their benefits. 
The Retirement Office performed this contract by determining 
the fixed amount of benefits due each plaintiff and by 
beginning to make lifetime monthly payments to plaintiffs. 
Thus, plaintiffs' benefits vested on the terms and conditions 
existing at the time they became "retirants" by withdrawing 
from the system. Defendants could not unilaterally alter this 
offer once accepted. 
Defendants made regular monthly benefit payments to 
plaintiffs for a period of almost two years before threatening 
to stop all further payments unless plaintiffs terminated from 
their present employment. It is clear that forfeiture of 
existing employment was not a condition of the State's 
retirement offer when it was made in 1983 and accepted by 
plaintiffs. 
A
- Pension Statutes Create A Contractual Relationship 
Between The State And The Pensioner. 
In the leading case of Driggs v. Utah State Teachers 
Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657, 105 Utah 417 (1943), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that pension benefits are more than 
mere gratuitous allowances. Pension programs are an inducement 
to continued public service and create a contractual relation-
ship between the state and the pensioner. Driggs, 142 P.2d at 
660-662. Thus, when the pensioner accepts the offer of the 
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state by satisfying all conditions precedent, the state is 
bound to perform the contract on the terms and conditions 
existing at the time the contract is formed. Driggs, 142 P.2d 
at 662-664; Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers 
Retirement Comm1 n, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1952). Once all 
conditions precedent are satisfied, the pensioner acquires a 
vested right to his pension on the terms and conditions then 
existing, which right may not be altered by subsequent legisla-
tion. Id. 
It was precisely for that reason that the state in 
Driggs was not able to alter the amount of plaintiff's pension 
after plaintiff had retired. Driggs1 pension rights were 
determined in accordance with the statutes in effect at the 
time of his retirement. Driggs is squarely on point and is 
controlling in the instant case. Likewise, in Newcomb, supra, 
the state was not free to unilaterally permit cancellation of 
its pension contract with plaintiff. 
Application of these very basic principles of contract 
and constitutional law produce a similar result here. Plain-
tiffs are entitled to have their contract enforced under the 
terms and conditions existing at the time they withdrew fro^ 
the Retirement System. The provision permitting continued 
employment is more than a mere gratuitous benefit, as charac-
terized by defendants. Quite to the contrary, that provision 
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is an integral part of the contract and it induced plaintiffs 
to withdraw from the system rather than continue to accumulate 
service credit and contributions, As in Priggs and Newcomb, 
defendants are not free to unilaterally change the terms of 
their agreement. 
B. The Legislative History Of The 1983 Amendment Does Not 
Entitle Defendants To Unilaterally Alter Vested 
Contract Rights. 
Defendants contend that the Legislature did not intend 
the result produced by the 1983 Amendment. (App. Brief at p. 
8). In support of this argument, defendants introduced into 
evidence the House debate on the 1983 Amendment (R182-183). In 
essence, defendants are attempting to characterize the 1985 
Amendment as curative legislation. It is well established, 
however, that even curative statutes may not impair vested 
rights. Davis v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 476 P.2d 635 (Kan. 
1970); Addison v. Fleenor, 196 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1948); 2 Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 41.11 and 41.12 (3d Ed. 
1973); 82 C.J.S., Statute § 430 (1953); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes 
§ 353 (1974). Thus, even if viewed as an attempt to cure an 
alleged defect, the 1985 Amendment may not divest plaintiffs of 
their vested contract rights. 
Defendants' reliance on the legislative history of the 
1983 Amendment is unavailing here for other reasons as well. 
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that 
-13-
extrinsic aids should not be used to construe a statute absent 
an ambiguity in the language of the statute itself. United 
States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1978); Cal. 
Teachers Ass'n. v. San Diego Com, College, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 
621 P.2d 856, 859 (Cal. 1981). Defendants did not satisfy this 
4 
basic prerequisite to consideration of legislative history. 
It also is widely recognized that legislative debates 
are suspect in determining legislative intent. It is often the 
case that those who did not express a view on the legislation 
did not necessarily agree with those who did speak in favor of 
its passage. 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 48.13 at p. 329 (4th ed. 1984). Thus, defendants' reliance 
on the House debate involving the 1983 Amendment is not 
persuasive, since this debate does not clearly indicate an 
intent to limit application of the amendment to only those 
public safety officials who changed jobs rather than those who 
remained in their jobs. There is simply no guarantee that 
members of the House who voted in favor of this legislation 
4Significantly, defendants did not introduce any legisla-
tive debates with respect to the 1985 Amendment. It is there-
fore impossible for this Court to determine whether, in fact, 
the Legislature actually believed that the 1983 Amendment had 
been misconstrued by the Retirement Board. The 1985 Amendment 
may simply be construed as a change in policy rather than an 
attempt to correct an erroneous interpretation of the earlier 
amendment. 
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perceived the same limitation upon it that defendants now 
contend those who spoke in favor of it intended. 
C. The 1983 Amendment Does Not Repeal By Implication 
Other Provisions Of Title 49. 
It is equally unavailing to suggest that the 1983 
Amendment repealed by implication other pension statutes set 
forth in Title 49. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9). Again, 
defendants' argument overlooks the underlying principle that 
vested rights may not be impaired by subsequent legislation, 
even where that legislation is intended to cure an alleged 
error in the interpretation of an earlier statute. 
Even if this basic principal were not applicable here, 
defendant's argument lacks merit. The Act itself states, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of 
the legislature that this act be liberally 
DThe case of Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335 
(Utah 1972), cited by Defendants, does not compel a different 
result. That case involved an apparent conflict between the 
statutory notice provisions pertaining to actions against 
municipalities and the tolling rules applied to claims of 
minors. Although the Gallegos court noted that a court may 
correct an erroneous judicial interpretation of a statute, the 
court refused to do so in that case because of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, stating that the law should be changed only when 
there has been a plain and obvious error. Moreover, Gallegos 
does not stand for the proposition that a court may reinterpret 
a statute so as to divest rights that have vested under a prior 
interpretation. 
^These statutes have been set forth in full under the 
heading "Statutes Subject to Interpretation." 
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construed so that the benefit and protec-
tions as herein provided shall be extended 
as broadly as reasonably possible. 
Utah Code Ann, S 49-11-9 (1981). This section merely codified 
the common law rule that pension statutes are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the pensioner. Driggs v. Utah State 
Teacher's Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657, 663 (Utah 1943) 
[citations omitted]. Thus, the 1983 Amendment should be 
construed liberally to afford the broadest possible coverage 
and be interpreted as consistent with other pension statutes. 
In addition, defendants concede that where laws are 
subject to more than one interpretation, one of which requires 
repeal by implication of other laws, the basic rules of statu-
tory construction require a reading that avoids repeal and 
gives effect to all laws. App. Brief at p. 9. Although defen-
dants are willing to apply this principle to the 1985 amendment 
so as to avoid repeal by implication with respect to that 
amendment, defendants apparently are unwilling to give the same 
deference to the 1983 amendment notwithstanding insignificant 
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differences between the two amendments as they apply to the 
7 
other pension statutes set forth in Title 49. 
D. The Court's Ruling Below Is Consistent With The 
Results Reached In Similar Cases. 
The result reached by the trial court is hardly novel, 
either here in Utah or elsewhere. The case of State Ex ReL 
McClean v. Retirement Board, Public Employees Retirement Fund, 
defendants contend that Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-11-8(30); 
49-11-34; and 49-11-37 are repealed by implication by the 1983 
Amendment. A brief review of those statutes clearly shows, 
however, that if the 1983 Amendment, as applied to plaintiffs, 
repeals those provisions, then the 1985 Amendment must have the 
same effect. The fact that one amendment permits the pensioner 
to remain in the same job while the other permits the pensioner 
to hold an identical position with a different employer, but in 
the same retirement system, is a "distinction without a 
difference" as far as the other Title 49 provisions are 
concerned. 
The definition of "service" envisions service which is 
included in computations relating to membership status or bene-
fit rights under the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8(19). Since 
plaintiffs' continued employment is not included in computa-
tions relating to membership status or benefit rights under the 
Act, their continued employment is not deemed service for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8(30). Similarly, because 
plaintiffs have not been "re-employed," their continued service 
does not violate Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-37. In fact, 'public 
safety officers who withdraw from the system pursuant * to the 
1985 Amendment more likely violate Section 49-11-37 than do 
plaintiffs since they must terminate their present jobs and 
start employment with a different covered unit within the same 
system to enjoy the benefits of Section 49-11-1. However, the 
term "re-employment" is not expressly defined and, in any 
event, it is clear that re-employment, like the definition of 
"service," contemplates service that is included in computa-
tions relating to membership status or benefits. Thus, neither 
amendment repeals by implication Section 49-11-37 or any other 
provision of Title 49, Chapter 11, because plaintiffs are not 
accumulating further service credits. 
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119 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio 1954), is almost directly on point as it 
involves working while drawing retirement benefits. in 
McClean, plaintiff was employed as a municipal clerk for more 
than 30 years before retiring in February of 1945. As a member 
of the Ohio Public Retirement System, plaintiff was granted a 
disability retirement allowance effective April lf 1945, 
pursuant to the provisions of the State statutes then in force. 
From April of 1949 to March of 1952, plaintiff was 
employed by a different municipality. The defendant Retirement 
Board removed plaintiff from the pension rolls because of this 
employment and demanded that plaintiff reimburse the amount of 
pension he drew for the period of his employment. The Retire-
ment Board relied on a 1947 Ohio statute, passed after plain-
tiff had retired, forbidding someone from being gainfully 
employed while drawing a disability retirement allowance. 
Although the Court disagreed with the Board's 
construction of the 1947 amendment, it held that even if the 
amendment did forbid simultaneous enjoyment of employment and 
pension benefits, it could not constitutionally be applied to 
plaintiff. In this regard, the Court stated as follows: 
Undoubtedly, the general assembly intended 
to restrict to some extent the right of a 
disabled employee to draw disability retire-
ment allowance while being otherwise 
employed, but, it is well settled that the 
general assembly could not, by legislation 
passed in 1947, deny an employee right to 
compensation which had already vested. The 
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realtor was retired February 15, 1945, on 
account of disability. His rights were 
vested as of that date in accordance with 
the statute then in force. [Statutory 
references omitted]. Neither of those 
sections contained any provision restricting 
the right of employment of one receiving 
disability retirement allowance. Inasmuch 
as the rights of the realtor to disability 
retirement allowance which had vested on or 
prior to February 15, 1945 could not be 
denied or restricted by subsequent legisla-
tion, [citation omitted], it is unnecessary 
to discuss the probable effect of the 
above-quoted revision of Section 486-63, 
General Code, which became effective June 5, 
1947, with respect to those granted 
disability retirement allowance subsequent 
to that date. 
• * * 
It is our conclusion that the right of 
realtor to disability retirement allowance 
was vested in February 1945 in accordance 
with the statute then in force; and that 
under those statutes, the realtor had the 
legal right to draw the disability retire-
ment allowance during the period from 
April 1, 1949 to March 1, 1952 (which 
concededly amounted to $2,860.20), and at 
the same time be gainfully employed by the 
City of Miami. 
Id. at 71-72 [emphasis supplied]. Similarly, plaintiffs here 
have a vested right to their retirement benefits regardless of 
their continued employment with their respective covered 
employer units. At the time plaintiffs withdrew from the 
Retirement System, there was no restriction on their right to 
continued employment and, by contract, they were allowed to 
receive retirement benefits while continuing their employment. 
Just as in McClean, supra, the statute restricting employment 
was enacted after plaintiffs1 contract rights already had 
vested. Defendants would impair those vested rights by 
imposing a condition on their enjoyment that was not part of 
the bargain on which plaintiffs relied in withdrawing from the 
system. See also Bellomini v. State Employees' Retirement 
Board, 445 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1982) [retirement board could not 
deprive plaintiffs of vested pension benefits on the basis of a 
subsequently enacted statute terminating benefits of public 
employees convicted of crimes relating to public office or 
public employment]. 
II. 
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT OFFERED PLAINTIFFS A 
SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR RETIREMENT BENE-
FITS AND CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT. 
Defendants correctly point out that vested pension 
rights are not absolutely protected under all circumstances 
o 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 12). Defendants also recognize, 
however, that before vested rights may be significantly 
^Defendants' reliance on very broad yet unarticulated 
"public policy" considerations is surprising, especially since 
defendants apparently requested no further consideration or 
clarification from the Legislature before implementing the 1983 
Amendment. (See App. Brief at pp. 12-13). The public policy 
of this state is determined by the state legislature, not by 
the Retirement Board. The Retirement Board is obligated to 
implement legislative enactments regardless of whether it 
agrees or disagrees with the policy considerations underlying 
those enactments. The Retirement Board discharged this duty by 
applying the 1983 Amendment in the manner in which it was 
written by the state legislature. The Retirement Board is not 
free to now re-evaluate public policy considerations and breach 
the State's contract with plaintiffs. 
The Retirement Board's "outrage" is even more curious 
given its endorsement of the 1985 Amendment. That amendment 
still enables a sheriff or police chief to withdraw from the 
public safety retirement system and continue employment within 
altered, the state must provide a "substantial substitute." 
Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers1 Retirement 
Common, 243 P.2d 941, 946-948. 
Defendants have not given plaintiffs here a "substan-
tial substitute." What defendants have given plaintiffs is a 
Hobson's choice between retirement benefits or continued 
employment, not a substitute for retirement benefits and 
continued employment—to which plaintiffs are entitled under 
the 1983 Amendment. In other words, Defendants are merely 
offering plaintiffs a choice that plaintiffs could have made 
9 
without the benefit of either the 1983 or 1985 Amendments. 
0
 Cont'd, 
the same system. Although the sheriff or police chief is not 
permitted to retain the same job, there is no requirement that 
he accept employment in a designated need area to prevent out 
of state public safety personnel from filling jobs in the 
public safety sector that would otherwise go to qualified 
Utahns. To illustrate, even under the 1985 Amendment, the 
police chiefs of Midvale and Murray could simply switch jobs, 
begin to receive retirement benefits and draw salary from their 
new employment. Certainly this inducement, and the arbitrary 
classifications drawn by the statute, do not enhan'ce the 
quality of police protection in this state or necessarily 
prevent out-of-state public safety personnel from filling 
similar positions in the so-called need areas of Utah. It is 
difficult to discern a legitimate basis on which to condemn the 
1983 Amendment on public policy grounds while condoning the 
results that may be reached under the 1985 Amendment. It also 
is inappropriate for defendants1 counsel to make allegations of 
so-called "triple dipping" that are not supported in the record 
below and which are completely irrelevant to this appeal. 
(App. Brief at p. 13). 
^Defendants have conceded that the actuarial soundness of 
the pension system has not been significantly affected by 
plaintiffs1 exercise of their rights under the 1983 Amendment. 
Defendants' characterization of the 1985 Amendment as 
a procedural rather than a substantive amendment is disin-
genuous. The case of Pilcher v. State Department of Social 
Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983), cited by defendants, 
involved a procedural change in the recovery of existing child 
support obligations. Obviously, the purely procedural remedies 
of Pilcher are readily distinguishable from vested contract 
rights. The right of plaintiffs to retire from the system and 
continue their present employment is a substantive rather than 
procedural right and may not be impaired by a subsequent 
amendment. 
Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1974), is also unpersuasive. Defendants rely on mere 
dictum from that case, unsupported by any other cited 
authority, to the effect that an amendment may be applied 
retroactively to clarify or amplify an earlier law. Again, 
Okland did not involve impairment of vested rights and the 
amendment at issue here goes well beyond mere clarification of 
existing law. As noted above, even curative statutes may not 
be applied to impair vested rights. (See Respondents' Brief at 
p. 13). 
Finally, defendants admit that plaintiffs' right to 
pension benefits is inviolate. (App. Brief at p. 15). What 
defendants ignore, however, is plaintiffs' right to enjoy those 
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benefits on the terms and conditions existing at the time they 
were permitted to withdraw from the Retirement System. The 
terms under which a pensioner may receive benefits may be as 
significant as the method by which those benefits are calcu-
lated. To suggest that the method of calculation may not be 
changed by the state, but the terms under which the benefits 
may be enjoyed may be changed by subsequent legislation, 
ignores the very basis of the bargain struck between the State 
and plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs and defendants entered into a binding 
executory contract at the time plaintiffs elected to withdraw 
from the Retirement System and continue their present employ-
ment. Plaintiffs1 pension rights vested on the terms and 
conditions existing at that time and, as in McClean, there was 
no restriction on plaintiffs' continued employment at the time 
the Retirement Board approved their respective retirements. 
Accordingly, the State may not alter its contract with plain-
tiffs by unilaterally imposing new conditions on enjoyment of 
plaintiffs1 vested rights. 
The legislative history of the 1983 Amendment is 
irrelevant to whether a contract was formed between plaintiffs 
and defendants. Moreover, the legislative history is incon-
clusive and there is no evidence that the 1985 Amendment was 
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intended to cure an alleged defect in the interpretation of the 
1983 Amendment. More importantly, it is well recognized that a 
curative statute may not impair vested rights, such as plain-
tiffs' contract rights here. 
Although vested rights are not absolute under all 
circumstances, defendants have conceded that the actuarial 
soundness of the pension system is not jeopardized by applica-
tion of the 1983 Amendment to plaintiffs. Moreover, even were 
defendants permitted to provide a "substantial substitute" for 
plaintiffs1 right to retirement benefits and continued employ-
ment, no such substitute has been offered here. To the 
contrary, defendants have offered plaintiffs a Hobson's choice 
in breach of their contractual obligations. 
This case is controlled by Driggs and its progeny and 
Respondents respectfully request that the judgment below be 
affirmed and that Respondents be awarded their costs. 
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